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In spite of the Erie doctrine, the application of federal common law has survived 
to overcome conflicting state laws in diversity actions where a federal law, interest or 
function is implicated.2 A federal court’s authority to substantively implement a federal 
common law rule over state law is clearest when the party to the action is a federal entity, 
namely an agency of the U.S. Government deriving its authority from the Constitution or 
some source of federal law.3 Analyzing such authority becomes more difficult in 
circumstances where parties to a diversity lawsuit are private citizens (not necessarily 
possessing any direct federal authority) seeking to have federal common law adopted to 
displace state law.  While the application of federal common law in private diversity 
actions has been held to be proper by the Supreme Court in certain cases,4 the analysis 
and justification for doing so has remained relatively unclear.5
As a result, federal courts are left with limited guidance as to when the application 
of federal common law is proper between private parties.  Furthermore, a federal court’s 
authority to hear disputes among diverse citizens is not limited to actions where the court 
derives its jurisdiction from 28 U.S.C § 1332 making analysis in certain situations even 
more problematic.  Special authority is granted under 28 U.S.C § 1367 to federal courts 
for hearing actions which are ancillary or supplemental to a federal court’s original 
jurisdiction over cases involving federal claims or federal questions.6 The Supreme 
Court has never directly addressed what the proper application of federal common law 
should be, or whether application would be proper at all, in the novel situation where a 
federal court is exercising ancillary or supplemental jurisdiction between private litigants 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.   
3It would seem appropriate to allow the substantive application of federal common 
law where the federal government is a party to an action in such ancillary proceedings 
given the clarity of the Supreme Court’s justification for doing so where the authority of 
the governmental agency or entity flows from the Constitution or some federal source of 
law whereby the action itself furthers some federal purpose.7 However, it is less certain 
whether a rule of federal common law may be applied substantively over state law in 
favor of a private litigant in such a proceeding.  Surprisingly, this question has been 
addressed under the extremely novel and narrow circumstances surrounding the 
disgorgement proceedings of SEC appointed receivers appointed to disgorge fraudulent 
transfers made as part of multi-jurisdictional Ponzi schemes.8
A fraudulent conveyance action brought before a federal court by a receiver 
against an investor who has received fraudulent transfers in the form of “profits” as part 
of a Ponzi scheme is not brought under federal law nor is it connected in any way to the 
Federal Bankruptcy Code.9 Furthermore, no federal uniform fraudulent conveyance 
statute exists under which the receiver may file an action for disgorgement.  As a result, 
the cause of action against the investor must be brought under the color of state 
fraudulent conveyance law.10 Consequently, extraordinary conflicts-of-law issues arise 
in these disgorgement proceedings where transfers have been made to investors across 
state lines as part of multi-state Ponzi schemes because of the great divergence from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction in fraudulent conveyance law as well as other relevant state 
law which may be applicable to the proceeding.11 
In such disgorgement proceedings, elaborate, eloquent and well-reasoned 
arguments can be made for the application of state law favorable to the Ponzi scheme 
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which state law is applicable when considering the form in which the transfers are made 
and to the entity or entities to which the transfers are made.12 Additionally, an investor 
investing as a shareholder of an offshore entity can conceivably manipulate state veil-
piercing piercing doctrines to thwart disgorgement.13 As a consequence, uniformity of 
outcome in such proceedings is lost and the receiver is burdened with choice of law 
issues and analysis anew with each subsequent disgorgement action filed against Ponzi 
scheme investors from different jurisdictions.   This substantially increases the receiver’s 
time and cost of litigation and ultimately decreases the total amount of recovered funds 
available for distribution to defrauded investors.   
It has been directly suggested by the 8th Circuit that a receiver appointed by a 
federal court to disgorge fraudulent transfers as part of a Ponzi scheme is serving a 
federal interest and function;14 the primary reason being that a federally appointed 
receiver serves as a quasi-federal entity (similar to the FDIC) to enforce the Securities 
and Exchange Acts by disgorging illegal profits made from violations of the Acts and is 
thus simultaneously serving a federal interest and function.15 This proposition supported 
the application of a uniform fraudulent conveyance rule under a federal common law 
standard in one such ancillary proceeding16 and could conceivably serve as the standard 
in the future for other similar ancillary proceedings involving private litigants.  
Furthermore, the decision may have broader implications concerning the substantive 
application of federal common law over state law in ancillary proceedings.   
It is well recognized that the application of federal common law implicates major 
constitutional concerns.17 Indeed, a federal court exercising authority to implement 
5common law does “engage in interstitial ‘lawmaking,’ as part of the process of 
interpreting positive law”18 raising serious separation of powers issues.  Federal judge-
made law may also have the consequence of impeding upon the autonomy and 
independence of states by preempting state law signaling federalism concerns.19 
Although the Supreme Court has arguably narrowed the scope of federal common law to 
“several well-recognized enclaves,”20 it has done so by “‘simply [listing] areas of law or 
categories of cases in which federal common law is permissible’ without providing any 
‘underlying rationale other than grandfathering.’”21 
It is the purpose of this paper to trace the development of SEC appointed 
receiverships in the Ponzi scheme context and analyze whether the analogy made by the 
8th Circuit, namely that these receivers are quasi-federal agents serving federal purposes 
and functions, can be reconciled with the Erie doctrine.  Part I of this paper will give a 
general overview of the evolution of federal common law since the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Erie. A careful analysis of the development of federal common law in the 
post-Erie era reveals that the substantive application of a rule of federal common law 
over state law would be met with the least level of objection when two circumstances are 
satisfied all of which are directly implicated in the ancillary disgorgement proceeding of 
the SEC appointed receiver. 
The first scenario is when the party claiming the benefit of the federal common 
law rule1 derives their authority directly from either the Constitution or some federal 
source of law creating a “uniquely federal interest.”  The second circumstance is when 
the consequence of not substantively adopting the federal common law formulation over 
 
1 In the majority of these cases, this party has either been the Government of the United States or an 
executive agency of the U.S.  See, e.g., Clearfield Trust; Kimbell Foods; O’Melveny 
6state law shatters uniformity in outcome having the ultimate consequence of frustrating 
an integral federal purpose of an Act of Congress or some other integral federal policy.  
Simultaneously, the frustration of federal purpose must also be the result of a state law’s 
conflict with the federal purpose which will either override or will be irrelevant to a 
state’s reliance on the displaced law.   
When these circumstances are implicated, it is generally the case that traditional 
constitutional dangers of substantively applying federal common law are not implicated.  
Specifically, this paper will show that the federalism concerns of the Erie doctrine are not 
at issue when federal common law is adopted in the disgorgement proceedings of SEC 
appointed receivers.  However, separation of powers issues (the analysis of which is 
conspicuously less developed in the major Supreme Court cases allowing the adoption of 
federal common law rules over state law) may be of concern when considering what law 
should be adopted as federal judge-made law in ancillary proceedings to displace 
conflicting state laws.  Nevertheless, it is likely not to a degree significant enough to 
allow for the frustration of integral federal functions. 
Part II of this paper will show how the 8th Circuits reasoning in Bryan v. Barlett 
falls within the scheme enumerated above.  First, this part will give a brief overview and 
background of Ponzi schemes and the impetus behind appointment of receivers for the 
benefit of defrauded investors from such schemes.  Secondly, this part will highlight the 
conflicts of law issues which arise in ancillary disgorgement proceedings brought by 
federally appointed receivers over entities used in multi-state Ponzi schemes.  
Furthermore, it will discuss how resolution of these issues can frustrate the receiver’s 
ability to recover “false profits” from investors for the benefit of defrauded investors and 
7how conflicts analysis can conceivably benefit investors investing as offshore entities 
upsetting the receiver’s recovery efforts.  This portion of Part II will primarily discuss 
how the facts of a multinational Ponzi scheme led a Federal District Court in the Western 
District of Virginia exercising ancillary jurisdiction to adopt the Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfers Act (UFTA) as federal common law using the 8th Circuits rationale.   
Part III concludes.  
 
I. Background of Federal Common Law 
 
Though Justice Brandeis famously asserted in Erie v. Tompkins, “[t]here is no 
federal general common law,”22 the decisions of the Supreme Court following Erie 
clearly show the application of federal common law as a rule of decision over state law is 
proper under certain conditions.23 In fact, on the same day Erie was decided, the 
Supreme Court allowed the adoption of a general rule of decision under federal common 
law to apportion the water of an interstate stream between two states.24 As a general rule, 
the Court has stated “in the absence of an applicable Act of Congress it is for the federal 
courts to fashion the governing rule of law according to their own standards.”25 
However, the substantive application of federal common law, where there is a 
dispute between two states, still carries with it serious constitutional concerns.26 
Primarily, problems with separation of powers and federalism may arise.27 Professor 
Bradford R. Clark adequately explains the dilemma: 
First, federal common law, because not clearly rooted in statutory or constitutional 
sources, appears to involve judicial lawmaking - a task at least in tension with federal 
separation of powers.  To be sure, federal courts undoubtedly engage in interstitial 
“lawmaking,” as part of the process of interpreting positive law.  By hypothesis, at least, 
federal common lawmaking begins where interpretation ends.  Such open-ended 
lawmaking by courts raises constitutional concerns because it bears a troublesome 
8resemblance to the exercise of legislative power - power apparently reserved by the 
Constitution to the political branches. 
 
Second, because federal common law preempts state law, federal common law also raises 
two related federalism concerns, at least as applied to matters within the legislative 
competence of the states. Federal common law arguably intrudes upon state authority by 
departing from the Constitution and the Rules of Decision Act, which - as interpreted in 
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins - appear to require federal courts to apply state law 
“except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress.” 
(citation omitted) Federal common law further threatens the autonomy and independence 
of the states by requiring state courts to apply federal judge-made law notwithstanding 
contrary state law, even though the Constitution's reference to the "supreme Law of the 
Land" does not obviously include federal judge-made law.28 
In response to these concerns, the Supreme Court has spoken in terms of limiting 
the scope of federal common law to “several well-recognized enclaves.”29 The Supreme 
Court has recognized those enclaves to be “in such narrow areas as those concerned with 
the rights and obligations of the United States, interstate and international disputes 
implicating the conflicting rights of States or our relations with foreign nations, and 
admiralty cases.”30 While some commentators suggest the “enclave” approach provides 
some foundation for courts to “mitigate the constitutional difficulties,”31 others observe 
they provide little in the way of guidance since they “‘simply list areas of law or 
categories of cases in which federal common law is permissible’ without providing any 
‘underlying rationale other than grandfathering.’”32 
Commentators have struggled with fashioning a uniform standard for courts to 
adopt when applying a federal common law rule of decision.33 Indeed, the application of 
federal common law is amorphous and enigmatic considering the relatively low level of34 
and seemingly inconsistent35 guidance provided by the Supreme Court.  This paper does 
not assert any proposed approach is applicable to the ancillary disgorgement proceeding 
of an SEC appointed receiver.  It merely observes that the constitutional questions 
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proceedings, mainly questions of federalism, are not necessarily implicated as a practical 
matter in these ancillary proceedings.  Whether the application of a substantive rule of 
federal common law is appropriate in the constitutional sense is subject to philosophical 
constitutional inquiry and is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
A.  Evolution of Federal Common Law in the Post-Erie Era 
In the post-Erie era, the Supreme Court has addressed the application of federal 
common law in cases where the U.S. government has been a party36 as well as in 
diversity actions between private parties.37 While the Supreme Court’s rationale for 
allowing or denying the application of federal common law is relatively unclear and 
possibly inconsistent especially with respect to private parties,38 the substantive 
application of federal common law over state law is clearest under three distinct and 
recognizable circumstances.  A brief overview of the Supreme Court’s decisions 
regarding federal common law in cases involving both the federal government and 
private citizens as parties over the last six decades reveals such a trend. 
 1. The Federal Government as a Litigant 
The clearest and most oft cited Supreme Court decision regarding the application 
of federal common law to displace state law where the federal government is a litigant is 
perhaps Clearfield Trust Co. v. U.S.39 In Clearfield Trust, the United States was 
attempting to recover from Clearfield Trust funds drawn through a forged endorsement 
upon a check issued by the U.S. government.40 Clearfield Trust had guaranteed all prior 
endorsements upon the check in compliance with federal regulations prior to presenting it 
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to the Federal Reserve Bank for payment.41 The forgery was reported to the United States 
but was not immediately made known to Clearfield Trust.42 Subsequently, an action 
against Clearfield Trust was brought in federal court by the U.S. several months later.  At 
issue was whether the rights of the parties were governed by state law and whether the 
federal government was barred from recovery for unreasonable delay as a result.43 
The Supreme Court held: 
 We agree... that the rule of Erie does not apply to this 
action. The rights and duties of the United States on 
commercial paper which it issues are governed by federal 
rather than local law. When the United States disburses its 
funds or pays its debts, it is exercising a constitutional 
function or power. This check was issued for services 
performed under the Federal Emergency Relief Act of 
1935, 49 Stat. 115. The authority to issue the check had its 
origin in the Constitution and the statutes of the United 
States and was in no way dependent on the laws of 
Pennsylvania or of any other state. (citations omitted) The 
duties imposed upon the United States and the rights 
acquired by it as a result of the issuance find their roots in 
the same federal sources. (citations omitted) In absence of 
an applicable Act of Congress it is for the federal courts to 
fashion the governing rule of law according to their own 
standards... 
 In our choice of the applicable federal rule we have 
occasionally selected state law. (citation omitted) But 
reasons which may make state law at times the appropriate 
federal rule are singularly inappropriate here.  The issuance 
of commercial paper by the United States is on a vast scale 
and transactions in that paper from issuance to payment 
will commonly occur in several states. The application of 
state law, even without the conflict of laws rules of the 
forum, would subject the rights and duties of the United 
States to exceptional uncertainty. It would lead to great 
diversity in results by making identical transactions subject 
to the vagaries of the laws of the several states. The 
desirability of a uniform rule is plain.44 
From the Court’s ruling in Clearfield Trust, it is evident that where the authority 
of the government comes directly from a federal source, the source being either the 
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Constitution or a federal statute, the need for applying a rule of federal common law may 
be warranted.45 The Court suggests the need is increased if the application of state law 
“would subject the rights and duties of the United States to exceptional (emphasis added) 
uncertainty”46 and result in “making identical transactions subject to the vagaries of the 
laws of the several states.”47 The ultimate effect of adopting state law in this case would 
have been to frustrate the federal government’s ability to discharge its duties.  The forged 
check in this case was an offense against the United States.48 As the Court discussed, the 
U.S. had a clear right and duty to sue for recovery on this check; a right which flowed 
from the Constitution and the statutes of the United States.49 
Therefore, the principle to be drawn from Clearfield Trust with respect to the 
application of federal common law over state law is that where the federal government is 
a party to an action, if the source of the government’s authority is derived from the 
Constitution or from a “statute[ ] of the United States,”50 the adoption of a uniform rule is 
proper if the adoption of state law would shatter uniformity and frustrate an essential 
federal interest.  The Court appeared to implicate a problem with adopting a rule of state 
law in a manner which would seriously impede the government’s ability to affect an 
affirmative duty and right which was distinctly federal in nature and purpose. In fact, this 
principle has subsequently guided the Supreme Court in decisions regarding the 
application of federal common law where the federal government is a litigant, most 
notably in U.S. v. Kimbell Foods, Inc. 51 
In Kimbell Foods, two actions filed in two different states (Texas and Georgia) by 
the SBA and FHA were on appeal to the Supreme Court.  The Texas action concerned 
whether priority should have been given to an SBA commercial lien over that of a private 
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creditor’s (Kimbell’s) lien even though the SBA’s lien was perfected subsequent to 
Kimbell’s.52 Though both liens were perfected in accordance with Texas law, the SBA 
argued the “choate lien rule” applied under federal common law over Texas law giving 
priority to their lien since Kimbell’s lien interest was not sufficiently specific to allow 
them “first in time” status.53 The Georgia action involved an FHA lien issued to secure a 
tractor that was subsequently acquired by a repairman through Georgia law after the 
tractor owner could not pay for repairs made by the repairman.54 In the recovery suit 
filed by the FHA against the repairman, the District Court found Georgia law to be 
applicable giving priority interest to the repairman.55 On appeal, though the Court of 
Appeals ruled against the FHA, it held federal common law to be applicable to the 
circumstances of the case and devised a special rule derived from the U.C.C. to award the 
tractor to the repairman.56 
While the Supreme Court found the authority of the SBA and FHA to be derived 
from a federal source consistent with the factors in Clearfield Trust,57 it did not find that 
the uncertainties “resulting from the application of state law would frustrate specific 
objectives of [their] federal programs” enough to adopt a uniform federal rule.58 Relying 
on precedent from United States v. Yazell,59 the Supreme Court held: 
Because SBA operations were “specifically and in great 
detail adapted to state law,” (citation omitted) the federal 
interest in supplanting “important and carefully evolved 
state arrangements designed to serve multiple purposes” 
was minimal. (citation omitted) Our conclusion [in Yazell]
that compliance with state law would produce no hardship 
on the agency was also based on the SBA's practice of 
“individually [negotiating] in painfully particularized 
detail” each loan transaction. (citation omitted) These 
observations apply with equal force here and compel us 
again to reject generalized pleas for uniformity as 
substitutes for concrete evidence that adopting state law 
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would adversely affect administration of the federal 
programs.60 
Since the FHA regulations also incorporated state law in a manner similar to the SBA, the 
same logic also precluded the application of a uniform rule to their action.61 
The Court further ruled: 
Because the ultimate consequences of altering settled 
commercial practices are so difficult to foresee, we hesitate 
to create new uncertainties, in the absence of careful 
legislative deliberation. Of course, formulating special rules 
to govern the priority of the federal consensual liens in 
issue here would be justified if necessary to vindicate 
important national interests. (emphasis added) But neither 
the Government nor the Court of Appeals advanced any 
concrete reasons for rejecting well-established commercial 
rules which have proven workable over time. Thus, the 
prudent course is to adopt the readymade body of state law 
as the federal rule of decision until Congress strikes a 
different accommodation.62 
The level of uncertainty in outcome that could frustrate uniformity adversely 
affecting a federal interest which in turn would warrant the application of a federal 
common law rule was clarified by Kimbell Foods, Inc. The Court in Kimbell appeared to 
establish a vague guideline.  Even though authority from a federal source may be found63 
and uniformity in outcome may lead to uncertainty in result, these factors alone will not 
necessitate displacing state law in favor of a uniform federal rule. 64 The degree to which 
a federal interest is frustrated must also be considered and weighed against a state’s 
reliance upon the law in question.65 In Kimbell, both the SBA and FHA anticipated the 
applicability of state law to their lending programs and conformed their programs to these 
expectations66 indicating that the federal programs would not necessarily be disturbed 
absent a uniform rule.  In light of these factors, the Court appeared more concerned with 
how a uniform federal rule would alter “settled commercial practices”67 established 
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around state law.  Consequently, displacement should only occur when “specific 
objectives” of a federal law or a federal purpose are frustrated.68 
Arguably, the Court’s decision reveals that with regard to uniformity, a two 
pronged analysis is necessary.  First, a Court should consider to what level the state law 
being displaced by a uniform federal rule is relied upon.  In the commercial context, 
Kimbell shows that if state commercial law is well settled and generally relied upon, 
indicating an anticipation that state law will apply to a particular transaction, a uniform 
federal rule is likely not appropriate.  Secondly, if a state’s reliance on the law is 
considerably frustrated by adoption of a uniform rule, a Court should consider to what 
level that reliance is frustrated if a uniform federal rule is adopted.  Reiterating the 
Court’s position in Kimbell, if the “ultimate consequences of altering settled commercial 
practices [is]... difficult to foresee,”69 then a uniform rule displacing state law is not 
suitable. 
It is important to note that an interesting dilemma does surface in light of both 
Clearfield Trust and Kimbell Foods with respect to the twin dangers of federalism and 
separation of powers issues implicated from the application of federal judge-made law.  
In Clearfield Trust, the Court finds the circumstances compelling enough to warrant 
adoption of a uniform federal rule so as not to frustrate an important federal function 
regardless of significantly state law would be displaced.  However, little consideration is 
given to whether the judiciary, as a lawmaker, is competent to fashion the uniform rule 
necessary to achieve the specific federal purpose invoking some separation of powers 
concern.  Similarly, the Court in Kimbell Foods also seems overly concerned with how 
state law, with regard to commercial expectations, would be frustrated by adoption of a 
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federal rule and does not delve deeply into whether a federal court is authorized to create 
such a rule (probably because it did not need to reach the issue); although it did note that 
“formulating special rules to govern... here would be justified if necessary to vindicate 
important national interests” perhaps indicating if compelling federal interests did exist, 
as they did in Clearfield Trust, displacing even settled state law could be appropriate. 
Both cases seem to suggest that if the federal interest or function in question is 
significantly frustrated, the balance is tilted considerably in favor of adopting a judicial 
rule of law.  The problem left unanswered by the Supreme Court, as alluded to 
previously, is whether the “interstitial lawmaking”70 of a federal judge is sufficiently 
weighed against the federal legislature’s authority, interest and competence to address the 
conflict.  However, it is possible to construe the Supreme Court’s lack of consideration 
for the separation of powers issue in another manner; and that is, when the frustration of 
the federal interest or function is so egregious that it would severely hinder an essential or 
central federal purpose unnecessarily subjugating the federal government to the 
uncertainty of state law, as was the case in Clearfield Trust, the urgency and need for 
implementing a rule of law to adequately dispose of an issue in favor of the federal 
government will always outweigh any separation of powers considerations.  Furthermore, 
it should be noted that a legislature’s ability to act to displace or rectify judge-made law 
is not effected in any way by the adoption of a uniform rule as federal common law. 
Regardless of these Constitutional concerns, the lessons to be drawn from 
Clearfield Trust and Kimbell Foods in analyzing the application of federal common law 
to the ancillary proceedings of the SEC appointed receiver is to focus on the nature of a 
commercial transaction and the state laws applicable to that transaction.  This will play an 
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important role in determining whether adopting a uniform rule under federal common law 
is proper when considering the fraudulent transfer made as part of the Ponzi scheme. 
 2. Private Litigants 
It is well settled that the substantive application of federal common law to 
displace state law is not limited only to cases where the federal government is a litigant.71 
However, considerable confusion remains as to what circumstances must exist in order to 
adopt a rule of federal common law in actions between private parties.  The Supreme 
Court’s development of federal common law in litigation involving private litigants has 
seemingly been inconsistent.72 In fact, commentators have observed “some [Supreme 
Court] cases suggest that the federal interest may be less immediately implicated in 
litigation to which the United States is not a party,”73 while other cases have allowed the 
adoption of federal common law among private litigants where the federal interest was 
ostensibly just as tenuous.74 Nevertheless, the controlling principle behind the adoption of 
federal common law to displace state law in these cases has been whether there will be a 
direct effect upon an identifiable federal interest or function in the absence of such 
adoption having the consequence of frustrating a specific federal objective or creating a 
significant conflict with federal law.75 
Perhaps the most significant Supreme Court case dealing with the substantive 
application of federal common law between private litigants which may provide some 
guidance for private litigation in ancillary proceedings where federal interest are 
implicated is Boyle v. United Tech. Corp.76 In Boyle, the father of a Marine helicopter 
pilot brought a defective repair and negligent manufacture claim against the independent 
defense contractor who designed the helicopter flown by the pilot.  The pilot perished in a 
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crash alleged to have been the result of negligent repair flaws and design defects which 
prevented his timely escape after the helicopter went down.77 At issue was whether a 
“military contractor defense” could be asserted by the contractor under federal common 
law to preclude the father’s recovery under his state law claim since the contractor 
designed the helicopter in accordance with a contract entered into with the United 
States.78 
The Court concluded two areas of “uniquely federal interest[]”79 were involved.  
First, the Court recognized that the obligations of the United States under contract were 
governed exclusively by federal law.80 While the case at hand did not involve the 
obligations of the United States under contract, but rather the liability to third persons, the 
liability nevertheless arose from performance of a federal contract.81 Secondly, the Court 
acknowledged that the “civil liability of federal officials for actions taken in the course of 
their duty”82 was, in many instances, controlled by federal law.83 Analogizing from 
Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Const. Co.,84 an earlier decided case in which a private landowner 
was precluded from holding a private contractor liable under state law for building dikes 
for the federal government, the Court reasoned: 
“[I]f [the] (sic) authority to carry out the project was validly 
conferred, that is, if what was done was within the 
constitutional power of Congress, there is no liability on the 
part of the contractor for executing its will.”(quoting 
Yearsley) The federal interest justifying this holding surely 
exists as much in procurement contracts as in performance 
contracts; we see no basis for a distinction. 
 
The Court went on to distinguish Boyle from other previously decided cases 
involving private litigants where the “‘federal interest in the outcome of the [dispute] 
before... [was] (sic) far too speculative, far too remote a possibility to justify the 
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application of federal law....’”85 Instead, Boyle involved a case where the circumstances 
would have a more direct effect.86 The Court extrapolated: 
The imposition of liability on Government contractors will 
directly affect the terms of Government contracts: either the 
contractor will decline to manufacture the design specified 
by the Government, or it will raise its price. Either way, the 
interests of the United States will be directly affected. 
 
Therefore, the federal objective implicated was not too attenuated or speculative.2
Having concluded that a “uniquely federal interest” existed, the Court then turned 
to Kimbell Foods second criterion for determining whether to displace settled state law, 
namely, gauging whether a “significant conflict” between the identified federal interest or 
 
2 Boyle was decided by a divided court (5-4) that disagreed strongly on whether the facts of Boyle were 
necessarily distinguishable from past cases involving the displacement of state law by federal common law 
among private litigants.  Justice Brennan keenly observed there was no distinction in the present case from 
past cases: 
 
In Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25 (1977), for example, the county was contractually 
obligated under a grant agreement with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to “‘restrict 
 the use of land adjacent to . . . the Airport to activities and purposes compatible with normal 
airport operations including landing and takeoff of aircraft.’”(citation omitted). At issue was 
whether the county breached its contractual obligation by operating a garbage dump adjacent to 
the airport, which allegedly attracted the swarm of birds that caused a plane crash. Federal 
common law would undoubtedly have controlled in any suit by the Federal Government to enforce 
the provision against the county or to collect damages for its violation. The diversity suit, 
however, was brought not by the Government, but by assorted private parties injured in some way 
by the accident. We observed that “the operations of the United States in connection with FAA 
grants such as these are undoubtedly of considerable magnitude,” (citation omitted) and that “the 
United States has a substantial interest in regulating aircraft travel and promoting air travel 
safety.” (citation omitted). Nevertheless, we held that state law should govern the claim because 
“only the rights of private litigants are at issue here,” (citation omitted) and the claim against the 
county “will have no direct effect upon the United States or its Treasury.” (emphasis added) (sic). 
 
[Discussion of other cases involving private litigants] 
... 
 
Here, as in Miree... a Government contract governed by federal common law looms in the 
background. But here, too, the United States is not a party to the suit and the suit neither 
“touch[es] the rights and duties of the United States,” (citation omitted) nor has a “direct effect 
upon the United States or its Treasury,” (citation omitted) The relationship at issue is at best 
collateral to the Government contract. We have no greater power to displace state law governing 
the collateral relationship in the Government procurement realm than we had to dictate federal 
rules governing equally collateral relationships in the areas of aviation, Government-issued 
commercial paper, or federal lands. 
 
Boyle v. United Technologies Corp, 487 U.S. 500, 520-21 (1988)(Brennan J., dissenting). 
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related federal legislation would result if state law were applied87 or whether “application 
of state law would ‘frustrate specific objectives’ of federal legislation.”88 Ultimately the 
Court found that allowing a state law claim to proceed would in fact disrupt an exception 
to the Federal Tort Claims Act which precluded claims “based upon the exercise or 
performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the 
part of a federal agency...whether or not the discretion involved be abused.”89 The Court 
concluded: 
 We think that the selection of the appropriate design for 
military equipment to be used by our Armed Forces is 
assuredly a discretionary function within the meaning of 
this provision. It often involves not merely engineering 
analysis but judgment as to the balancing of many 
technical, military, and even social considerations, 
including specifically the trade-off between greater safety 
and greater combat effectiveness. And we are further of the 
view that permitting “second-guessing” of these judgments 
(citation omitted) through state tort suits against contractors 
would produce the same effect sought to be avoided by the 
FTCA exemption. The financial burden of judgments 
against the contractors would ultimately be passed through, 
substantially if not totally, to the United States itself, since 
defense contractors will predictably raise their prices to 
cover, or to insure against, contingent liability for the 
Government-ordered designs. To put the point differently: 
It makes little sense to insulate the Government against 
financial liability for the judgment that a particular feature 
of military equipment is necessary when the Government 
produces the equipment itself, but not when it contracts for 
the production. In sum, we are of the view that state law 
which holds Government contractors liable for design 
defects in military equipment does in some circumstances 
present a “significant conflict” with federal policy and must 
be displaced. 
 
B. Post-Erie Developments of Federal Common Law and their Potential 
Applicability in the Ancillary Disgorgement Proceedings of the SEC 
Appointed Receiver 
20
Though the party claiming the benefit of the federal common law rule in Boyle 
was a private litigant, the Supreme Court was not prevented from finding a uniquely 
federal interest.  The principle that a private litigant cannot be prevented from invoking a 
rule of federal common law will be helpful to the SEC appointed receiver who is 
necessarily a private litigant.  More importantly, Clearfield Trust and Kimbell Foods both 
establish that where the source of authority of the party claiming the benefit of the federal 
rule is derived from a federal source of law, the need for adopting a uniform rule may be 
warranted.  This establishes the first criteria for federal common law analysis.  This 
criteria will be important to the SEC appointed receiver whose authority is arguably 
derived from the Securities and Exchanges Acts.90 
While a federal interest may be implicated, the inquiry does not stop there.  
According the law of Boyle and Kimbell Foods taken together, before adoption of the 
federal rule, the court must consider whether the federal interest or purpose will be 
directly effected.  A consequence that is too remote or speculative on the interest will not 
be sufficient to warrant adoption of a uniform federal rule.  Furthermore, significant 
conflict between the displaced state law and the identified federal interest must exist or it 
must be shown that displacement of the state law is necessary to avoid frustration of the 
federal interest.  This analysis sets up the second criteria for federal common law 
analysis.  For the SEC appointed receiver, conflict between state law and the goals and 
purposes of the Securities and Exchanges Acts will be at issue when considering the 
displacement of state fraudulent conveyance law or state veil-piercing doctrines. 
It should be noted that the Supreme Court’s analysis in these cases take the 
federalism issues into consideration, but do little to quell the separation of powers 
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concerns associated with the implementation of judge-made law.3 The competency of the 
judiciary to act as a quasi-legislature is rightly questioned when considering the adoption 
of a uniform rule of federal common law.  Though the Supreme Court has ruled that a 
federal interest can be compelling enough to displace state law overriding federalism 
concerns, as was the case in Clearfield Trust and Boyle, the authority and competence of 
the judiciary to create uniform rules to affect federal interests signals a dilemma with 
separation of powers which has not be thoroughly addressed by the Supreme Court. 
Arguably, the Supreme Court’s relatively minimal consideration of this issue was 
in cases where the frustration of the federal interests or functions were so egregious that 
they would have severely hindered essential or central federal purposes unnecessarily 
subjugating the federal government to the uncertainty of state law as was the case in 
Clearfield Trust or allow for the “second-guessing”91 of intrinsically federal discretionary 
powers as was the case in Boyle. The urgency and need for implementing a rule of law to 
adequately dispose of conflicts issue in favor of the federal government where such 
integral federal interests were implicated may have outweighed any separation of powers 
considerations.  Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, Congress’ ability to act to displace or 
 
3 This was indeed a deeply disturbing fact for Justice Stevens who dissented in Boyle:
When judges are asked to embark on a lawmaking venture, I believe they should carefully 
consider whether they, or a legislative body, are better equipped to perform the task at hand. There 
are instances of  so-called interstitial lawmaking that inevitably become part of the judicial 
process. n1 But when we are asked to create an entirely new doctrine -- to answer "questions of 
policy on which Congress has not spoken," (citation omitted) -- we have a special duty to identify 
the proper decisionmaker before trying to make the proper decision. 
 
When the novel question of policy involves a balancing of the conflicting interests in the efficient 
operation of a massive governmental program and the protection of the rights of the individual -- 
whether in the social welfare context, the civil service context, or the military procurement context 
-- I feel very deeply that we should defer to the expertise of the Congress. 
 
Boyle, 487 U.S. at 531-32 (1988) (Stevens J., dissenting) 
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rectify judge-made law is not effected in any way by the adoption of a uniform rule as 
federal common law.   
The adoption of a uniform rule under federal common law to displace state 
fraudulent conveyance law is similarly one of compelling federal concern to the SEC 
appointed receiver.  As discussion in the next part will show, the application of different 
state fraudulent conveyance laws to the disgorgement proceedings will severely frustrate 
the impetus behind the Securities and Exchanges Acts to protect unsophisticated 
investors.  The need to adopt a uniform fraudulent conveyance rule in such proceedings 
implicates no real frustration or binding obligation on state law and is in fact irrelevant to 
a state’s reliance on fraudulent conveyance law which is primarily a law applicable in the 
bankruptcy context.  Furthermore, adoption of different state veil-piercing doctrines over 
a federal veil-piercing standard to reach majority shareholders of offshore entities 
investing in Ponzi schemes creates a significant conflict with the goals of the 33 and 34 
Acts if the corporate veils of such entities are not pierced.  The next part will show that 
the frustration of these federal purposes by adoption of state law create the compelling 
circumstances necessary to adopt a uniform rule of federal common law. 
 
II. Federal Common Law in the Disgorgement Proceedings of SEC 
Appointed Receivers 
 
A.  Ponzi Schemes and the Appointment of Receiverships 
1.  The Ponzi Scheme as a Violation of the Securities and Exchange Acts 
In order for a Ponzi Scheme92 to violate the Securities and Exchange Acts of 1933 
and 1934, the Ponzi scheme must first satisfy Section 2(a)(1) of the 33 Act.  The 33 and 
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34 Acts only govern what can be defined as “securities.”93 The Supreme court has read 
Section 2(a)(1) liberally, saying that Congress defined “security” so broadly that it may 
encompass virtually any instrument that might be sold as an investment.94 Whether or 
not a transaction falls within the meaning of a security is based on the economic realities 
involved in the transaction.95 
The Securities Act, for purposes of characterization of a Ponzi scheme, partially 
defines an “investment contract” as a security.96 The term “investment contract” is 
defined as any “contract, transaction, or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a 
common enterprise and is lead to expect profits solely from the efforts of a promoter or 
third party.”97 The well-known Howey test delineates a three part standard for purposes 
of determining whether a transaction falls within the SEC's interpretation of an 
investment contract.  This standard shows that in order for an “investment contract” to be 
deemed a security the transaction must include (1) an investment of money, (2) in a 
common enterprise with (3) the expectation of profits produced by the efforts of others.98 
The typical Ponzi scheme requires the investment of money.99 Therefore, the first 
prong of the Howey test is satisfied.  Second, investors in the Ponzi scheme usually invest 
their money into a single entity, usually a fictional corporation established by the 
operators of the scheme.  As a result, investments can be seen as becoming part of a 
common enterprise in conformance with the second prong of the Howey test.100 Ponzi 
schemes lure investors through promises of high returns on investments through the 
efforts of the scheme operators.  Restated, investments are made in the scheme, generally 
by average and unsophisticated investors, solely for the high rate of promised returns 
coming from the “investment” efforts of the scheme operators through their managing of 
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the fictional entity.101 Therefore, in a typical Ponzi scheme, the three criteria delineated 
in Howey are met.     
Section 17(a) of the 33 Act, Section 10 of the 34 Act, and Rule 10(b)(5) 
encompass the basic anti-fraud provisions of the Acts applicable against the perpetrator 
or perpetrators of a Ponzi Scheme.102 These provisions all prohibit fraudulent conduct or 
practices in connection with the offer or sale of securities.103 In order to be liable for 
securities fraud, the accused must have made (1) a material misrepresentation or a 
material omission as to which he has a duty to speak, or used a fraudulent device, (2) 
with scienter, (3) in connection with the sale of a security.104 A showing of scienter is an 
element of an enforcement action pursuant to the antifraud provisions of the Securities 
Acts.105 Scienter is the mental state of intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.106 Intent 
on the part of the perpetrator of the alleged Ponzi scheme, or the perpetrator as an agent 
for the corporation heading the scheme, is required in order to enforce any of these 
provisions of the Acts.107 
2. The Appointment of a Receiver and the Disgorgement of Fraudulent Transfers 
Since the promised rates of return in a Ponzi scheme are always in excess of any 
real investment and creditors are unable to be paid by nature of the scheme’s structure, a 
“Ponzi corporation” is deemed to be effectively insolvent from its inception.108 A federal 
court, in dealing with the assets of an insolvent Ponzi corporation, may appoint a receiver 
to marshal and collect misappropriated funds in order to redistribute those funds to 
creditors and defrauded investors.  The legal fiction is that the receiver acts on behalf of 
the corporation and not the investors in the scheme because the Ponzi corporation is 
considered to be a “legal entit[y] separate from principal and injured by [fraudulent] 
25
transfers.”109 The fraudulent transfers are the fictitious “profit” distributions paid to old 
investors from new investor funds.  The appointment of a receiver takes the corporation 
and its assets out of the hands of the wrongdoer and places them in the hands of the 
receiver.110 
The receiver may bring actions based on law or equity in any state, federal, or 
foreign court to recover fraudulent conveyances made as part of the scheme.111 A
receiver is generally appointed in the jurisdiction where the SEC brings action against the 
operators of the scheme.  In actions brought in federal court, the federal court maintains 
ancillary or pendent jurisdiction over any claims filed by the receiver to disgorge 
fraudulent transfers.112 Because the Ponzi corporation is not considered bankrupt under 
the meaning of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, the receiver proceeds to disgorge fraudulent 
transfers under the applicable state fraudulent conveyance law as opposed to federal 
fraudulent conveyance law.113 
Receiverships in Ponzi scheme situations allow defrauded investors to obtain 
redress efficiently through the receiverships power.  A receiver in a typical Ponzi scheme 
proceeding of securities fraud seeks out and recovers the corporation’s misappropriated 
assets, used and acquired as a result of the scheme, in order to redistribute them among 
defrauded investors involved in the scheme.  Similar to a trustee in bankruptcy, a receiver 
may only sue to redress injuries to the entity in receivership.114 The receiver's job is to 
maximize the value of the Ponzi corporation ultimately for the benefit of the 
corporation’s defrauded investors and creditors.115 Stated in other terms, the receiver's 
goal is to maximize the recovery of funds invested in the scheme so that they may be 
returned in some degree to the wronged investors.   
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B. The Receiver’s Choice of Law Problems 
The greatest obstacle for a receiver to overcome in disgorging fraudulent transfers 
made to investors is resolving the extraordinary number of conflicts of law issues which 
arise during litigation.116 As discussed earlier, the receiver must bring actions against 
individual investors under state fraudulent conveyance law in federal court through the 
federal court’s pendant or ancillary jurisdiction over the federal claims against the 
operators of the Ponzi scheme.117 Therefore, the first conflict of law issue to decide is 
under which state fraudulent conveyance law the receiver should proceed.  Depending on 
whom the action is brought against and which jurisdiction the investor resides in, this can 
be a daunting task as the ensuing discussion shows.   
Often times, the lucrative nature of a Ponzi scheme will attract the more 
sophisticated investor with its high promised rates of return.  These investors often invest 
as single shareholders of offshore entities.  Sometimes, as is often the case, these 
investors can be indirect insiders to the general scheme.118 The shareholder investing on 
behalf of her wholly owned offshore corporation and receiving distributions under the 
name of the offshore corporation is particularly troublesome and can give rise to 
numerous conflicts issues.  Ideally, the appropriate measure to take in such a 
circumstance would be to pierce the veil of the offshore corporation in order to reach the 
domestic single or majority shareholder receiving contributions from the scheme in a 
U.S. Federal Court.  However, the divergence of veil-piercing doctrines from jurisdiction 
to jurisdiction may impede the possibility of such an action or may shift a heavier burden 
of proof on the receiver extending the amount of time in litigation and cost of 
litigation.119 
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Using the 8th Circuits reasoning from Bryan v. Barlett as adopted by the Western 
District of Virginia in Terry v. June,120 this section will also show how a uniform federal 
veil-piercing doctrine and a uniform fraudulent conveyance rule can be applied under 
federal common law in these circumstances to displace conflicting state laws. 
1.  The Problem with Determining Which Fraudulent Conveyance Law Applies 
For conflicts of law purposes it is important to first characterize the nature of the 
legal issue.121 Generally, for purposes of determining conflicts of law, many federal 
courts have characterized fraudulent conveyances as torts.122 While some courts have 
held otherwise,123 a strong argument in favor of classifying fraudulent conveyances as 
torts committed against the Ponzi corporation is that the nature of the scheme itself 
warrants such an interpretation.  When investors receive distributions in excess of their 
contribution, the corporation becomes increasingly insolvent. 124 In fact, the corporation 
is insolvent the moment the distribution is made.125 Each transfer made to an investor in 
excess of their contribution effectively depletes the assets of the Ponzi corporation.126 
Therefore, it can be argued that each distribution accepted and retained by an investor 
amounts to a tort against the Ponzi corporation contributing to its insolvency. 
This argument may be successful in satisfying that a tort has been committed 
against the Ponzi corporation and that an investor should be held liable.  However, the 
matter of where the tort has occurred still remains unresolved.  For resolving conflicts of 
law questions, this is the essential issue.  Determining where the tort has occurred may 
determine which state’s fraudulent conveyance law is to be applied.  Of course, this 
analysis is easier stated than done. 
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To begin with, in diversity actions a federal court must apply the conflicts laws of 
the state in which it sits.127 While the federal court’s jurisdiction over the receiver’s claim 
is ancillary to the federal question claim against the Ponzi scheme operators and is not a 
diversity action, the receiver’s fraudulent conveyance actions will be exclusively state 
law claims.128 Therefore, it can be argued that the conflicts laws of the forum state 
should be applied as in diversity actions brought under state law.129 This approach 
presents the most practical and outcome determinative solution to resolving which state’s 
conflicts principles should be applied in order to determine what state law is applicable. 
Naturally, the next step would be to apply the forum state’s conflicts principles to 
determine which state’s law governs.  Most states have adopted either the “rational 
relationship” test under the Restatements130 or follow the well-settled principle of lex loci 
delicti, also known as the “place of the wrong” test.131 The “rational relationship” inquiry 
focuses on which state has the most significant relationship with the transaction, or the 
tort in the Ponzi scheme context.132 The principle of lex loci delicti requires the court to 
look into the last act necessary to complete the transaction or tort.133 For purposes of 
fraudulent conveyances, under both of these tests the court would be required to examine 
either how the conveyances came about or what the last act necessary to complete the tort 
of fraudulent conveyance was.  Under this analysis, it appears the focus of inquiry in the 
Ponzi scheme context would be where the acts occurred which depleted the Ponzi 
corporations assets. This could mean either looking to where the investment contract was 
formed, what state or states the majority of the distributions to the investor were made in 
or from, or, if distributions were made by checks or wire transfers to investors, where the 
last acts necessary to complete those transactions occurred.   
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Regardless of which approach is taken, the analysis is unnecessarily protracted 
and fails to provide a predictable outcome from case to case.  A strong position can be 
taken on each of the above mentioned possibilities for resolving conflicts of law 
disputes.134 This compounds problems for the receiver.   It results in the receiver being 
burdened with more litigation against the investor with respect to resolving these issues 
increasing time and cost.  More importantly, there is no uniformity in outcome.  
Fraudulent conveyance diverges from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.135 The application of 
fraudulent conveyance law in one jurisdiction could conceivably allow an investor to 
keep her distributions while the law of another may require a similarly situated investor 
to disgorge.  In essence, the receiver is faced with fresh choice of law issues in each new 
action brought against investors to disgorge distributions which can break either in favor 
of the investor or the receiver.  In the end, the consequence is more time and money spent 
in recovering investor funds and depletion of the recovery which is to be redistributed 
back to investors who have lost their principle investment in the scheme.  
2.  Problems with Piercing Offshore Entities 
The most traditional method of asset and liability protection has been the 
establishment of corporations, limited liability partnerships and limited liability 
companies.136 In particular, establishing such entities offshore in island nations such as 
the Bahamas or the Cayman Islands can provide a substantial form of asset and liability 
protection for the individual investor.  Many sophisticated Ponzi investors who are 
indirect insiders to the scheme, knowing of the nature of the scheme and the scheme’s 
eventual demise, having tremendously benefited from its generous “profit” distributions, 
enter the scheme as single or majority shareholders of such entities in order to thwart 
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litigation or, at the very least, make it costly and difficult to disgorge their ill gotten 
gains.   
Establishing jurisdiction over offshore entities can be a substantial barrier.  Under 
U.S. law, the corporation or entity must be served in accordance with the Hague 
Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extra-Judicial Documents in Civil and 
Commercial Matters.137 This assumes the offshore entity resides in a country that is party 
to the treaty.4 The Convention requires “[t]he authority or judicial officer competent 
under the law of the State in which the documents originate” to forward copies of the 
document to the designated Central Authority in the country where the documents are to 
be served.138 Once delivered to the Central Authority, the Central Authority must 
approve that service has complied with the provisions of the Convention and only then 
will it proceed to serve the documents.139 
This poses some major obstacles for the receiver.  Process can take between 3-6 
months to complete placing an extraordinary time impediment on recovering investor 
funds.  Fraudulent conveyance actions brought by the receiver are subject to a statute of 
limitations (generally two years) from the time of appointment.  Discovering distributions 
made in excess of the principle invested and tracing transfers made to individual 
shareholders of such entities can take over a year leaving the receiver with limited time to 
bring an action against such an entity. Furthermore, assuming service is had, jurisdiction 
is found proper and a judgment is attained, a federal court exercising ancillary 
jurisdiction may not retain jurisdiction to enforce the judgment.140 This may leave the 
receiver with having the judgment enforced against the individual or majority shareholder 
 
4 Currently the Hague Convention on Service Abroad is in force in these offshore nations: Aruba, Bahamas, 
Barbados, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. 
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in either a state court in the state in which the investor resides or in the foreign court of 
the country in which the entity is incorporated or formed.   
This poses two practical problems.  Under the first scenario, a state court will 
naturally adopt its own veil piercing doctrine in order to determine whether the judgment 
can be enforced against an individual shareholder.  Depending on the stringency of the 
veil-piercing doctrine it will either prevent the receiver from piercing to reach the 
shareholder or may require the receiver to prove more facts which warrant piercing under 
the state’s doctrine increasing the receiver’s time and cost of litigation.   
Under the second scenario, a foreign court may be reluctant to enforce a judgment 
entered in a non-native jurisdiction because they may be dissatisfied with the manner in 
which process is served141 or because of due process concerns.142 The principal of 
“territoriality” may also be cumbersome to overcome in enforcing any judgments 
obtained in the U.S.143 One commentator examines: “As an initial matter, a judgment can 
be enforced only within the territorial jurisdiction of the court that entered it. To enforce 
against property in another [foreign] jurisdiction, the holder must establish its judgment 
in that jurisdiction. The ‘full faith and credit’ clause of the United States Constitution 
assures that a judgment of one state will be enforced in the courts of another; the 
principle merely requires formal proof of the existence and validity of the judgment. 
Foreign countries, however, may require that the underlying cause of action be 
relitigated.” 144 The United States is not yet party to any treaties for the enforcement of 
judgments abroad.   
C.  Overcoming Conflicts of Law Issues Through Adopting Federal Common Law 
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Taking the Clearfield Trust, Kimbell and Boyle cases into consideration in the 
SEC appointed receivership context, three major hurdles emerge for the SEC appointed 
receiver of a Ponzi corporation to overcome.  First, the receiver must establish some 
source of federal authority for invoking a uniform federal rule.  The 8th Circuit’s 
reasoning in Bryan v. Barlett is satisfying and in conformance with established law with 
respect to this factor.  Next, a receiver must show that adoption of a uniform rule is 
necessary to affect a federal interest or purpose.  Finally, the receiver must show that the 
displacement of state law will not raise the general concerns of federalism when federal 
common law is applied substantively.  This analysis was not made in Bryan most likely 
because adoption of a uniform federal fraudulent conveyance rule in the Ponzi receiver 
context, which was at issue in the case, was irrelevant to the ordinary transactions which 
state fraudulent conveyance laws normally address and did not implicate the 
unforeseeable consequences mentioned in Kimbell.145 However, this analysis may be 
important in adopting a uniform federal veil-piercing doctrine over state law doctrines in 
a disgorgement proceeding dealing with a Ponzi investor investing as an offshore entity. 
1.  The Concept of a Receiver Serving a Federal Interest and Function 
The proposition that a Court appointed Receiver serves a federal interest is 
directly supported in Bryan v. Bartlett.146 In Bryan, the SEC sued a bank seeking to 
enjoin violations of the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934.147 The court entered a 
temporary injunction and appointed a federal equity receiver over the bank to protect 
defrauded investors.148 The receiver then sued the bank’s directors to recover on certain 
promissory notes belonging to the bank.149 The directors argued that state law should 
govern their defenses in the case150 but the 8th Circuit disagreed:  
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 We find this proposition doubtful.  Federal 
jurisdiction in this case is based, not on diversity of 
citizenship, but on a federal equity receivership 
arising from violation of the federal securities 
regulation statutes.  The receiver was appointed in 
this case to prevent further violations of the federal 
securities laws and to preserve the assets for the 
benefit of the investor-creditors of the companies, 
who are primarily individual citizens of many 
different states and whose financial interests were 
endangered by the securities law violations of the 
defendants.  As Professor Loss points out, “surely 
this [SEC receivership proceeding] is an instance of 
the post-Erie survival of a ‘federal common law’ (in 
this case, equity).” 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 
1513 n.113 (1961). 
 We find no cases directly in point on this issue, 
but an analogy may be drawn from the case of 
D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. F.D.I.C., 315 U.S. 447, 
62 S. Ct. 676, 86 L. Ed. 956 (1942).  In that case, 
the F.D.I.C. brought suit on a note which it had 
acquired an asset from collateral for a loan made to 
a state bank.  The defense of want of consideration 
was asserted, but the parties could not agree on 
which state law was to be applied to the transaction, 
it being alleged that under Missouri law the defense 
was proper, while under Illinois law the defendant 
would be estopped to deny liability on this ground.  
The Supreme Court held that the matter was not a 
question of state law, but of federal law.  There 
were two reasons for this result.  First, the 
corporation was an agency of the federal 
government and second, the policy underlying the 
Federal Reserve Act to protect the assets of public 
banks from misrepresentation required the questions 
presented to be determined by federal standards.  
Here the receiver, while not a federal corporation, is 
an officer of a federal court appointed because of 
violations of federal law.  The policy underlying the 
federal Securities Act of 1933 is to protect investors 
from the fraudulent sale of securities and the 
common loss of investment which follows from 
violations of the act.  In unsnarling the tangled 
affairs of these corporations to preserve insofar as 
possible assets for distribution to the defrauded 
investors, the receiver is performing a federal 
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function.  These are substantial reasons for applying 
a federal rule of decision to this case.151 
The federal interest in the Ponzi receiver context is made clear.  According to 
Bryan, the federal interest is the vindication of investors defrauded from the Ponzi 
scheme operators’ violations of the Securities Acts.  In this respect, the Receiver serves 
an important federal function and purpose by enforcing the Securities Acts through the 
Court’s ancillary powers.  In essence, the receiver is made a quasi-federal agent whose 
authority is derived from the Securities Acts.  This analogy conforms neatly to the 
“federal source of power” and “frustration of purpose” propositions described in 
Clearfield Trust.
The degree to which the federal purpose would be exacerbated is not directly 
considered but assumed in Bryan. However, the discussion from the preceding section 
clearly reveals the receiver’s practical barriers resulting from the adoption of conflicting 
state fraudulent conveyance law and state veil-piercing doctrines.  Considering the 
implications of these factors, a serious “frustration of federal purpose” under Kimbell’s 
two pronged inquiry with respect to uniformity can be established.   
 a. Applying Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Rule 
The need for a federal rule of law in this case far outweighs a state’s reliance or 
interest in fraudulent conveyance law.  In the Ponzi scheme context, the reliance is 
irrelevant since a state’s interest in imposing fraudulent conveyance law is related to a 
debtor’s attempt to hide or divert assets from her creditors.152 In a Ponzi scheme, the 
transfers are paid as fictitious “profit” distributions and, though fraudulent, are not made 
with the specific intent to defraud creditors through the diversion of assets.  Rather, the 
transfers are made to show large returns on principal investments in order to deceive and 
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lure new investors so the scheme may continue.  Applying a uniform federal rule to this 
context has no implication upon or binding effect on debtor transactions aimed at 
defrauding creditors.  Arguably, it is irrelevant to a state’s reliance on fraudulent 
conveyance law.  Therefore, Kimbell’s concerns with the displacement of state law are 
not applicable in this context and a uniform federal rule may be applied substantively. 
The question then becomes what fraudulent transfer rule should be adopted as a 
uniform federal rule.  The use of uniform statutes as federal common law has often been 
held appropriate to displace state law.153 One aspect to consider in this determination is 
which uniform law has been adopted by most states.154 In the past, federal courts have 
applied the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA) as federal common law.155 
Currently, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act (UFTA) has replaced the UFCA and has 
been adopted by forty-two states and the District of Columbia.156 In the receivership 
context, it is reasonable to consider the UFTA as a national standard.157 
The language of the UFTA is considerably favorable for the receiver.  Most 
significantly, the UFTA shifts the burden of having to prove valuable consideration of the 
investor in good faith by the receiver to having the investor prove valuable consideration.  
Furthermore, since transfers made as part of a Ponzi scheme are presumed to be 
fraudulent, it is very difficult for an investor to prove that a fictitious “profit” distribution 
is not made with the intent to defraud.  Assuming valuable consideration is proved on the 
part of an investor, it will only allow for the retention of the principle investment and not 
any profits received.  This tilts the balance of litigation considerably in favor of the 
receiver.  As a result, once it can be shown that investors have received funds in excess of 
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their principle investments from a Ponzi operation, investors will be more likely to settle 
their disputes than to litigate. 
 b.  Federal Veil-Piercing Doctrine 
Additionally, where a violation of a federal statute benefits a corporation, veil 
piercing under federal common law may be appropriate.158 Not only do violations of the 
Securities Acts benefit the offshore corporation by allowing it to profit from fraudulent 
transfers as part of a Ponzi operation, but primarily the single or majority shareholder 
benefits from the violations as an alter ego.  In other words, acceptance of funds from the 
Ponzi scheme can be construed as tortuous acts falling outside of the corporate function 
to aide in violations of the Acts.    
It is firmly established that a domestic shareholder of a foreign corporation may 
be held liable for an act done by the corporation under the laws of the United States.159 It 
is also well settled  that “a state may impose liability upon a shareholder of a foreign 
corporation [under the state’s law] for an act done by the corporation in the state, if the 
state’s relationship to the shareholder is sufficient to make reasonable the imposition of 
such liability upon him.160 In First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior 
De Cuba, the U.S. Supreme Court reasoned: 
As a general matter, the law of the state of incorporation normally 
determines issues relating to the internal affairs of a corporation. 
Application of that body of law achieves the need for certainty and 
predictability of result while generally protecting the justified expectations 
of parties with interests in the corporation. (citation omitted) Different 
conflicts principles apply, however, where the rights of third parties 
external to the corporation are at issue. (citation omitted) To give 
conclusive effect to the law of the chartering state in determining whether 
the separate juridical status of its instrumentality should be respected 
would permit the state to violate with impunity the rights of third parties 
under international law while effectively insulating itself from liability in 
foreign courts.161 
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Whether to impose liability upon a foreign corporation under foreign law or U.S. 
State law is clear within the context of an “external” claim filed by a third party.  The 
language of First Nat’l Bank can and has been used against foreign corporations to 
protect victims of torts committed by the corporation within the state under state law.162 
Federal Courts have generally considered fraudulent transfers to be torts.163 The 
application of a federal common law rule in such a case does not necessarily run the risk 
of creating precedent which will subvert substantive state corporate law by the imposition 
of federal law nor will it thwart any other federal policy if the transfer is considered a tort 
committed against the Ponzi corporation.  The action is “external” and beyond the scope 
of the corporate charter or an ultra vires act.164 
Arguably, a shareholder does rely significantly upon the veil-piercing doctrine of 
the state in which they are incorporated.  However, in determining whether to disregard 
the corporate entity, “[t]he strength of the particular federal interest violated must be 
weighed, not only against state corporate law, but also against other federal policies that 
may be implicated.”165 This analysis allows the court to serve as a sort of “gatekeeper” 
that balances the equities in determining whether to allow a veil-piercing to proceed 
under federal standards.  It also conforms with the standards of Kimbell.
As discussed earlier, veil-piercing doctrines vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction 
with some being more stringent than others.  It is conceivable for one jurisdiction to 
allow piercing of an offshore entity to reach a shareholder that has received fraudulent 
transfers as part of a Ponzi scheme while another jurisdiction will maintain the integrity 
of the corporate form.166 The dangers of Clearfield Trust in “making identical 
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transactions subject to the vagaries of the laws of the several states”167 is evident.  The 
federal common law standard for piercing the corporate veil is then appropriate. 
The federal common law veil piercing doctrine perhaps provides the least 
cumbersome and surmountable method for reaching an offshore shareholder in the Ponzi 
scheme context.  It also provides the most uniform approach for the receiver when 
dealing with such entities.  The federal doctrine establishes a two pronged balancing test 
to determine whether the veil should be pierced.168 The first prong asks whether there is 
“such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation 
and the individual no longer exist.”169 The second prong must assess whether an 
“inequitable result will follow ‘if the acts are treated as those of the corporation 
alone.’”170 
It is presumable that a single shareholder of the entire stock or majority holder of 
an offshore corporation receiving fraudulent transfers in their entirety on behalf of the 
entity receives the full benefit of those transfers.  It can easily be said that the shareholder 
has a unity of interest with the corporation.  The difficulty under state law comes when an 
individual invests on behalf of the corporation as an “employee” of the corporation in the 
Ponzi operation.  It becomes especially difficult when the offshore corporation is engaged 
in other legitimate business activity managed by the majority shareholder and is not 
established merely as a “shell” corporation.  The federal common law doctrine is 
arguably a more relaxed standard and would still allow the veil to be pierced in such a 
context (where the offshore entity is engaged in a legitimate enterprise) if there is a 
minimal showing of the first factor. 
39
As for the second prong, the burden placed on the receiver of acquiring 
jurisdiction over the offshore corporation and the very real possibility that a domestic 
judgment against the corporation will not be enforced abroad certainly qualify as 
“inequitable results” in the event the veil is not pierced.  The prospect speaks heavily in 
favor of piercing and while there may be only a minimal finding of “unity of interest,” 
the presence of a federal interest, that being the enforcement of the Securities Act by 
recovering lost investor funds to the Ponzi scheme, could tilt the balance towards 
piercing.     
2.  The Case of Terry v. June 
While the language of Bryan was dicta,171 it proved persuasive for a federal court 
in the Western District of Virginia exercising ancillary jurisdiction over the disgorgement 
proceedings of a receiver appointed by the SEC to recover false profits made as part of a 
multinational Ponzi scheme.172 The facts of Terry v. June173 are unprecedented and truly 
reflect the “post-Erie survival of a ‘federal common law.’”174 
Roy M. Terry and the law firm of DurretteBradshaw were appointed as Receivers 
over a fraudulent Bahamian corporation, “Vavasseur,” developed and marketed as an 
investment and trading program.175 The program was orchestrated and operated mainly 
by a Terry L. Dowdell.176 Over a period of approximately four years, Dowdell managed 
to lure investors with promises of high rates of return (as high as 160 percent of principle 
investment) in the form of “profit” distributions.177 In fact, Dowdell paid these “profit” 
distributions to investors with funds he and his associates solicited from newer 
investors.178 No money was ever actually invested in any sort of venture.179 The scheme, 
which initially began in Florida and later moved to Virginia, was entirely fraudulent.180 
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Ultimately, the SEC and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) discovered and shut down 
the operation.181 The scheme attracted investors from no fewer than 26 states and foreign 
countries182 and managed to generate in excess of $121 million.183 
Robert June, Sr., a Michigan resident, was one of many investors involved in 
Dowdells’ program.184 June’s son, Robert June, Jr., was an employee of Dowdell who 
managed his father’s investments.185 Following the collapse of the scheme, the law firm 
of DurretteBradshaw filed action in federal district court against June, Sr. to recover 
funds as Receivers (hereinafter “Receivers”) of Vavasseur.186 The Receiver alleged June 
had received “substantial earnings” on his investment which were in reality merely the 
funds of later investors in Dowdell’s scheme.187 The Court maintained supplemental 
jurisdiction over the case because it was ancillary to the SEC’s main case against 
Dowdell.188 
After filing a complaint against June, the Receiver moved for summary judgment 
against June.189 At issue was which state fraudulent conveyance law would be applicable 
to the case.190 Though the scheme and program were operated mainly from two states, 
Florida and Virginia, Virginia being the state where Dowdell solicited June as an 
investor, the Court concluded that the UFTA was applicable under federal common 
law.191 The Court reasoned: 
[T]he present case...[is] one of those limited 
instances where the application of federal common 
law is appropriate, because there is a significant 
conflict between the federal interests involved and 
the application of state law. First, there is a strong 
need for uniformity in the treatment of the 
Receiver's various claims against those who 
allegedly received fraudulent transfers from the 
Dowdell fraud scheme. There is a federal interest in 
the consistent enforcement of the federal securities 
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laws, in which the Receiver's asset recovery efforts 
play a significant role. The Receiver has represented 
-- and the defendant has not disputed -- that the 
scope of the fraud includes no fewer than 26 states 
and foreign countries. Of the many individuals 
around the world who made similar investments in 
the same investment program, and who received 
fictitious profits in return, it would be unfair and 
illogical to allow some of those investors to retain 
their profits while forcing others to disgorge theirs. 
Yet that is the possible result of applying the laws 
of different states and nations to the Receiver's 
various suits. 
 
Second, the application of varying state and foreign 
laws could frustrate the objectives of the Receiver, 
which are federal in character, namely the 
protection of investors from the fraudulent sale of 
securities by recovering assets for distribution to the 
victim investors. The application of Virginia's 
fraudulent conveyance law could make the recovery 
of assets more difficult in this case, because it 
seems to set a higher bar than does the UFTA for 
setting aside fraudulent conveyances. (citation 
omitted) Moreover, the lack of a nationwide 
common law rule could subject the Receiver to 
additional litigation over the proper law to apply in 
different cases. The Receiver's additional expenses 
would be paid from funds that would otherwise be 
returned to the fraud victims, hindering the federal 
interest in maximum compensation for the victims 
of securities fraud. 
 
The need for uniformity and the objective of asset 
recovery, by themselves, may not be sufficient 
grounds for applying federal common law. (citation 
omitted) This case, however, also involves 
securities regulation -- an area governed by federal 
laws that are enforced in federal courts by a federal 
agency, the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
The Receiver here is performing federal functions. 
(citation omitted) He was appointed by a federal 
court; his powers are governed by the court order 
and by federal statutes. (citations omitted) The 
Receiver's efforts are an integral adjunct to the 
SEC's enforcement of the federal securities laws. 
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The federal securities statutes confer upon district 
courts broad equitable powers to fashion 
appropriate remedies, including the appointment of 
a receiver, to effectuate the purposes of the 
securities laws. (citation omitted) The Magistrate 
Judge's order of July 12, 2002 authorizes the 
Receiver to take necessary measures, including the 
bringing of legal actions, to prevent the dissipation 
of any receivership assets. The collection of these 
assets for their eventual disbursement to the fraud 
victims is a federal interest, which the court finds to 
be in conflict with the potential application of 
diverse state (and foreign) laws.192 
III. Conclusion 
The facts of a multinational or multi-state Ponzi scheme are generally very 
unique.  The application of federal common law to ensure the uniformity of outcomes 
and to ensure the quick resolution of ancillary claims resulting from the fraud perpetrated 
against innocent investors in a multi-jurisdictional Ponzi scheme is not only warranted 
under such narrow circumstances but, arguably, is necessary to effectively accomplish 
the federal purpose for which the receiver is appointed.  It is not uncommon to look to the 
spirit and purpose of the Securities Acts when unusual circumstances arise threatening 
the average investor and the general integrity of the securities market.193 
Ponzi schemes should be of particular concern when considering such potential 
harm.  The seemingly attractive and lucrative appearance of a Ponzi operation is 
especially alluring to unsophisticated investors seeking a generous return on their 
investment.  Since Ponzi schemes are destined to collapse, a cost effective and time 
efficient process should be in place to allow for the maximum recovery of lost funds.  
Indeed, this is the goal and purpose in appointing a receiver over collapsed entities 
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operating such fraudulent programs.  Decreasing the time and cost of the receiver’s 
litigation certainly accomplishes this goal.  Permitting the receiver to benefit from the 
adoption of a uniform fraudulent conveyance law under federal common law principles 
and also allowing a federal common law veil piercing standard in actions against 
investors that have received fraudulent transfers on behalf of wholly owned offshore 
corporations goes far in accomplishing this task by setting a uniform standard to apply in 
the various disgorgement actions they must commence against entities which have 
profited from ill-gotten gains. 
Conversely, Court’s should be concerned with the precedent that is established if 
uniform rules are not adopted under federal common law.   The variance in fraudulent 
conveyance law admittedly will frustrate uniformity for the receiver bringing civil 
ancillary actions against Ponzi scheme investors.  A very real consequence of applying 
different state fraudulent conveyance laws to essentially the same proceedings will be, in 
the words of Terry, “unfair and illogical” since it would “allow some... investors to retain 
their profits while forcing other to disgorge theirs.”  Furthermore, the burden placed on 
the receiver in resolving conflicts of law only increases the cost of the receiver’s 
litigation which is paid from recovered investor funds.   
Another consequence, with respect to investors of offshore entities, may be an 
indication to shareholders of such offshore corporations that there is unwillingness in 
federal court’s to hold individual shareholders liable through federal common law if there 
is a conflict with state corporate law.  Indirect insiders who benefit from such schemes 
can often be out of reach from prosecution by the SEC.  As a result, they would have an 
added wall of protection in setting up offshore entities if they could avoid civil liability 
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by making litigation timely and expensive for the receiver by operating in a state with lax 
veil piercing laws and by lengthening the time to serve process on these entities.  Such an 
outcome would frustrate the goal of the receiver by making disgorgement proceedings 
difficult, timely and expensive and could even discourage their prosecution. 
The receivership in the Ponzi scheme context clearly illustrates the necessity of 
federal common law.  The purpose of judge-made law is to intervene where statutes fail 
to address clear injustice and a legislature cannot act soon enough to remedy that 
injustice.  The dangers in usurping a state legislature’s authority in such a narrow context 
seem nonexistent.  Federal common law exists and must exist to displace the inequities 
which arise, and to address the unavoidable conflicts, within a system of government 
interconnected with other smaller governments.  Furthermore, the need for more flexible 
and malleable principles of federal common law are arguably necessary in the global 
business context to maintain the integrity of federal policy and purpose in the face of 
competing foreign law as is illustrated above. 
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